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Abstract Spreading information about the members of
one’s group is one of the most universal human behaviors.
Thanks to gossip, individuals can acquire the information
about their peers without sustaining the burden of costly
interactions with cheaters, but they can also create and
revise social bonds. Gossip has also several positive
functions at the group level, promoting cohesion and norm
compliance. However, gossip can be unreliable, and can be
used to damage others’ reputation or to circulate false
information, thus becoming detrimental to people involved
and useless for the group. In this work, we propose a the-
oretical model in which reliability of gossip depends on the
joint functioning of two distinct mechanisms. Thanks to the
first, i.e., deterrence, individuals tend to avoid informa-
tional cheating because they fear punishment and the dis-
ruption of social bonds. On the other hand, transmission
provides humans with the opportunity of reducing the
consequences of cheating through a manipulation of the
source of gossip.
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Introduction
In social groups, humans exchange information about other
individuals, their actions, behaviors, and attitudes, even if
they have never met each other before. Receiving infor-
mation about an absent third party is one of the most
effective ways of gathering news about our peers and
transmitting it is what is usually termed ‘‘gossip.’’ It is also
a widespread phenomenon in human societies, well-docu-
mented in many different kinds of societies and traditions.
Since the appearance of Gluckman’s article in 1963 in
which it was defined as a ‘‘culturally controlled game with
important social functions’’ (p. 312), several researchers
endeavored to show the positive aspects of gossiping, both
at the individual and at the social level (just to mention
some contributions: Barkow 1992; Baumeister et al. 2004;
Dunbar 1996; Ellickson 1991; Gintis et al. 2001; Goodman
and Ben-Ze’Ev 1994; Hess and Hagen 2009; Noon and
Delbridge 1993; Wert and Salovey 2004).
Of course the gossip can be just ‘‘idle-talk’’ or a plea-
surable activity people engage in for their own personal
amusement, but in most cases is not just that. Gossiping
can be regarded as a socially complex behavior through
which:
1. social information, i.e., information about an absent
third party, is gathered;
2. competence and reliability of informers is tested;
3. one’s own belonging to a group or sub-group is made
salient.
Gossipers select among the information they have the
one they want to transmit, but they also choose a receiver
and even a way to transmit that information. Gossiping
allows both to create and maintain bonds and to acquire
useful information without bearing the costs of direct
experience.
Gossiping can be used also for strategic purposes, as a
means to deceive people into thinking that, for instance, a
potential partner has a better (or worse) reputation. This led
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several scholars to raise the problem of reliability as one of
the defining features of gossip (Barkow 1992; Hess and
Hagen 2006; Paine 1967), and it poses some challenging
questions: if communication can be used to lie, how did it
survive? Why did false gossip not rule out honest com-
munication if cheating is more profitable? Even if these
questions apply to every kind of communication, including
animal one (Zahavi and Zahavi 1997; Maynard Smith and
Harper 1995; Maynard Smith and Harper 2003), here
reliability is especially important because gossip is a
powerful means of partner selection and social control
(Dunbar 1996; Giardini and Conte 2011).
In this work, we claim that the reliability of gossip rests
on two pillars: deterrence and transmission. In a nutshell,
deterrence prevents deterioration of gossip and its becom-
ing totally unreliable, while transmission ensures protec-
tion in those cases in which information is uncertain or it is
purposefully false. When spreading false social informa-
tion, the gossiper can be punished not only by the receiver,
but also by the gossiped. This means that spreading false
news about someone can be twice as dangerous as
spreading false or uncertain information about an inani-
mated object, like for instance the quality of a movie or the
location of a resource. Fear of punishment should have
ruled out gossip, leading people to restrain from talking
about others, at least when the information is uncertain,
inaccurate, or false. This leads us to raise a different set of
questions: how did gossip gain the importance it has and
what prevented it from extinction or transformation into
something different? Why did it not change into some kind
of very restricted form of communication, but is it still
widespread and present in human societies all over the
world?
We try to answer these questions by considering two
mechanisms that, taken together, can account for the evo-
lutionary stability of gossip. Deterrence is a general
mechanism that applies to other forms of communication
and to other species (Scott-Phillips 2008). In the case of
gossip, deterrence implies that the untrustworthy gossiper
can be punished by both the receiver and the gossiped and
third-party punishment enabled by language makes this
possibility more striking and more likely to occur. The
extreme consequence can be social exclusion, an extremely
unfavorable outcome, which is totally in contrast with the
affiliative needs satisfied through gossiping. Differently
than deterrence, the mechanism of transmission1 is specific
to gossip and reputation. Building upon the cognitive
model of reputation put forward by Conte and Paolucci
(2002), we argue that language provided humans with
the possibility of performing complex manipulations on
the information transmitted, allowing them to avoid
responsibility for what is told and then to escape punish-
ment. Transmission is one of the most frequently under-
rated aspects of gossip, with most of the accounts focusing
on the content or on the relationship between the individ-
uals involved and failing to address the fact that when
reporting information about someone else people may lie
about the source, preventing others to recognize them as
the actual origin of gossip.
Because of language humans can hide behind expres-
sions like ‘‘I have been told that…’’, or ‘‘people say…’’ so
spreading false information about someone without carry-
ing the burden of being regarded as unreliable informers.
This allows gossipers to be protected against retaliation and
to maintain their bonds even when transmitting false or
unverified information. The threat of social exclusion and
the possibility of escaping responsibility for false or inac-
curate evaluations, along with the need for social bonds,
led to the survival of gossiping.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: ‘‘Perspectives
on gossip’’ reviews some conceptions of gossip and reputa-
tion, showing on the fact that transmission is almost absent
from most of them. ‘‘A cognitive model of gossip’’ introduces
a cognitive model of gossip, in which the importance of the
source is clearly underlined and an important distinction
between information with known and unknown source is
introduced. ‘‘Deterrence and transmission as the evolutionary
pillars of gossip’’ describes the principles of deterrence and
transmission, discussing their role for the stability of gossip.
Finally, in ‘‘Conclusions’’ some conclusions are drawn.
Perspectives on gossip
Defining gossip is far from being an easy task. Dictionary
definitions concentrate on its being ‘‘casual’’ or ‘‘unreli-
able,’’ features always present in the everyday usage of
word ‘‘gossip.’’ These negative features are prominent also
in some scholarly accounts (Taylor 1994), in which it is
reduced to idle- or malicious talk behind someone’s back.
Here we will use the definition provided by Noon and
Delbridge (1993), who define gossip as ‘‘the process of
informally communicating value-laden information about
the members of a social setting’’ (p. 25). This definition
highlights the dynamic aspect of gossip and the fact that it
permits to spread valuable information about one’s peers.
One of the first contributions about the social relevance of
gossip has been the Gluckman’s article in 1963, in which
the positive functions of gossip at group level were high-
lighted. Gluckman (1963) has been one of the pioneers in
the study of gossip and one of the first to stress its positive
virtues, among which its ability to maintain the unity,
morals and values of social groups. Gossipers share and
1 Transmission is specific as long as we accept that ‘‘reputation’’ is an
evaluation in which the source is hidden.
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transmit relevant social information about group members
within the group, at the same time isolating out-group
individuals. Besides, reputation contributes to stratification
and social control, since it works as a tool for sanctioning
deviant behaviors and for promoting, even through learn-
ing, those actions that are functional with respect to the
group’s goals and objectives.
An opposite interpretation about gossip has been firstly
suggested by Paine (1967) who, in contrast with the
Gluckman’s account, considered gossiping as a self-serv-
ing behavior, aimed mainly at attacking others and pro-
moting one’s own status within the group. Similarly, the
Haviland (1977) study on the Zinacantecan patterns of
gossip points out to the usage of gossip as a means to
promote one’s own advantage to the detriment of others,
especially when the group is subject to internal struggles.
The opposition between ‘‘self-serving’’ and ‘‘group-serv-
ing’’ accounts of gossip has characterized the field for long
time, leading scholars to look for elements supporting one
or the other view. These views are not incompatible if we
consider that gossip intentionally spread for self-serving
purposes can have a positive effect at the group level.
Boehm (1984) calls gossip a kind of ‘‘court-room’’ and
concludes that it works as a system through which what
should be morally acceptable or unacceptable within the
group is continuously reassessed and refreshed. Other
anthropologists (Stewart and Strathern 2004) suggest an
interesting linkage between gossip and witchcraft, report-
ing studies about the critical role of rumor and gossip in
community contexts that lead to accusations of witchcraft:
‘‘It is a part of our overall argument that even when par-
ticular notions of witchcraft or sorcery are not involved,
rumor and gossip themselves may act as a kind of witch-
craft, projecting guilt on others in ways that may cause
them harm: for example, to lose their jobs, to be physically
attacked, or to be socially shamed’’ (p. 29). Scholars have
tended to stress either positive or negative functions of
gossip, but there is always the possibility of both positive
and negative results, and sometimes these may be mutually
implicated: a positive result for some people may be neg-
ative for others (Stewart and Strathern 2004).
Turning our attention to the motivations to gossip, we
find that some authors define gossip as idle-talk, giving a
preeminence to its relaxing and undemanding aspects
(Ben-Ze’ev 1994; De Sousa 1994), whereas others contend
that gossip has social purpose and people do not engage in
it simply for entertainment, but mainly to achieve their
goals (Foster 2004; Fine and Rosnow 1978). Fine and
Rosnow (1978) draw attention to three main social func-
tions served by gossip: information, influence, and enter-
tainment. Gossip is a valuable source of information about
the community, its members, its norms, values and habits,
but it is also useful to map the social environment and to
make inoffensive comparisons. Regarding the influence,
this function is potentially prevalent when newcomers join
the group or when there are conflicts between members.
Foster (2004) adds a fourth function: friendship, that refers
both to dyadic relationships and to group bonded together
by the sharing of norms and values.
Other researchers consider gossiping as a means of
knowledge: according to Ben-Ze’ev (1994) gossip is a
pleasurable way to gather information that is otherwise
hard to obtain, but it also serves to satisfy the so-called
tribal need, namely, the need to belong to the group and to
be accepted by it.
More recently, Baumeister et al. (2004) describe gossip
as an exchange of useful information people can rely upon
to face new situations and to behave properly when direct
experience is impossible or too costly to acquire. Wert and
Salovey (2004) highlight the social character of gossip, and
define it as an evaluative talk aimed at social comparison.
Through gossip people can map the social environment and
become conscious of their position within it.
The absence of the target is one of the defining features
of gossip, but it is also one of the reasons why gossip is
condemned as immoral and is considered a malicious and
harmful resource cowards use to criticize their peers
(Taylor 1994). According to this perspective, the absent
third party finds herself in an uncomfortable position: she is
not aware of what is told about her and she cannot defend
against gossip. On the contrary, the absence of the third
party can be considered as playing a positive function in
protecting the gossiped against direct and embarrassing
attacks or comparisons. In light of social comparison the-
ory (Festinger 1954), gossip can be regarded as a necessary
tool for healthy social functioning, that allows people to
compare their skills and achievements with those of others,
without suffering from direct and, somehow, harmful,
comparisons (Wert and Salovey 2004). This view seems to
reconcile the opposition between self-serving and group-
serving gossip we discussed above. Promoting one’s own
abilities and successes can be functional to let other people
know about what characteristics are valuable within a
given group (courage, for instance), thus indirectly pro-
moting the display of that behavior in the group. In an
evolutionary perspective, the relevance of gossip has been
primarily addressed by Dunbar (1996), whose seminal
work on grooming and gossip has clearly addressed the
correlation between social information and the evolution of
larger brains in human and non-human primates (Dunbar
2001).
Reputation, via gossip, has attracted the interest of
researchers from evolutionary biology and experimental
economics, who are interested in the role that reputational
concerns, and gossip transmission could have played in the
evolution of cooperation. Theories of indirect reciprocity
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show how cooperation in large groups can emerge when
agents are endowed with or can build a reputation (Alex-
ander 1987; Mohtashemi and Mui 2003; Nowak 2006;
Ohtsuki and Iwasa 2004; Panchanathan and Boyd 2003).
From theoretical models and simulations (Nowak and
Sigmund 1998a, b) to laboratory experiments (Milinski
et al. 2002; Sommerfeld et al. 2007a, b; Wedekind and
Milinski 2000), there is a growing body of evidence that
human cooperation in large groups can be explained in
terms of conditional helping by individuals who want to
uphold a reputation and so to be included in future
exchanges (Panchanathan and Boyd 2004). Moreover,
several studies (Haley and Fessler 2005; Burhnam and
Hare 2007; Bateson et al. 2006) point out the existence of
cognitive mechanisms or neural substrates especially
evolved for taking into account the presence of others and
the possibility of being evaluated by them. Reputation can
work as a useful guidance to make decisions about possible
interactions, to evaluate candidate partners, to understand
and predict their behaviors, and to show one’s acceptance
of the group’s values.
Finally, the content of gossip, i.e., personal information
about an absent third party, is quite uncontroversial,
whereas the nature of the information, either evaluative or
factual, is a matter of debate. Some authors require only the
repetition of news about an absent third party to define a
conversation as gossip, whereas other scholars consider
necessary the presence of evaluative remarks to have a
gossip talk (Fine and Rosnow 1978). Observational data
support the view that gossipers mainly exchange evaluative
contents about their peers (Ellickson 1991; Kniffin and
Wilson 2005), whereas laboratory experiments show that
the mere report of an individual’s past action is enough to
affect participants’ cooperative attitude (Piazza and Bering
2008; Sommerfeld et al. 2007a, b).
Providing a detailed review about the research on gossip
is out of the scope of this work, and this overview was
meant to point out how scattered is the picture coming from
research on this topic. This might be partially due to the
inherent difficulty of studying a phenomenon that can be
neither reduced to measurable variables nor easily
observed ‘‘in the wild.’’ In fact, gossiping requires intimacy
and discretion, and these two features are hardly compat-
ible with the presence of an external observer (as it happens
in observational studies), and are even more difficult to be
created within an experimental laboratory.
A cognitive model of gossip
As the above review shows, all those accounts fail to
consider the transmission process, which should be one of
the main features of gossip and the source of its power.
Language allows gossip to be easily transmitted, but also
transformed, an occurrence very likely to happen either
accidentally (rumor) or intentionally. Language enables
humans to modify the content of what they have been told
in a variety of ways, whereas animals can use false signals
(fake alarm calls) but they can neither report on a signal
from another individual nor report on it as if it came from
member of the group. This difference between a signal
transmitted as if it has been received by someone else (as in
the sentence ‘‘someone told me that John is a good guy’’)
and a signal from one’s own (‘‘I met John and he is really
nice’’) could have played a key role in the evolution of
gossip.
The first ones to formulate this hypothesis were Conte
and Paolucci (2002), who developed a model of gossip as
an occurrence of the so-called micro–macro link (Conte
and Castelfranchi 1995): it is an apparently autonomous
social behavior whose bases stand in the individuals’ minds
and in the relationships people engage in. Once created and
transmitted gossip influences other agents’ minds, chang-
ing their beliefs and goals.
In order to provide a characterization of gossip as a
process through which social evaluations are transmitted,
Conte and Paolucci (2002) focus their attention on the way
in which the evaluation is spread. Depending on the pres-
ence of the source in the evaluation, two different repre-
sentations can be accounted for, both in the sender’s and in
the receiver’s mind. When the source of the evaluation is
explicitly stated, this implies an assumption about the
truth-value of that information, and the evaluation is
termed ‘‘image.’’ Therefore, image is defined as a social
evaluation—regarding another agent’s competence,
behavior, attitudes, etc.—that is assumed to be true by the
individual who transmits it. If I say that I saw John kissing
another woman, I am also saying that I believe in what I
saw, so I believe true the fact that John is a betrayer.
Reporting this information to John’s wife means to bear the
responsibility for what I am telling her. An agent may also
report the image that someone else formed about a given
target, so I can tell John’s wife that Sally saw him kissing
another woman. In this case, I do not necessarily assume it
to be true, but there is another specific individual who did it
and who is in charge of that evaluation.
The term reputation defines an evaluation that is not
necessarily assumed to be true because the source is
missing. In a sense, reputation is a collectively held meta-
evaluation because there are agents believing that some
others, preferably in their group, believe that an agent is
told to have some features. When reporting that I heard that
John is a betrayer, I am not, implicitly or explicitly, saying
that I have reasons to believe that this evaluation is true.
Therefore, I am responsible neither for the evaluation itself
nor for its truth-value. Saying that someone believes John
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to be a betrayer means to state that this belief is circulating
in the group, but it is impossible to assess how many people
know it and believe it. Reputation is an objective social
property that emerges from a propagating cognitive rep-
resentation. This lack of an identified source, i.e., its
impersonality, is the distinctive feature of reputation,
whereas image always requires identifying the individual
who made the evaluation (Giardini Conte Paolucci
forthcoming).
Generally speaking, gossip has a triadic structure in
which we can distinguish:
• A gossiper: an agent who has the goal to spread
information. Informing another agent can be the
gossiper’s only purpose, or it can be instrumental to
other goals (influencing the receiver, punishing the
target, promoting self-image, enhancing groups feel-
ings, isolating someone), more or less hidden.
• A topic: an agent whose behaviors, attitudes, choices,
and emotions are the topic of the communication. The
target belongs to the same group of gossiper and
receiver, and she is judged according to the groups’
rules and habits.
• A receiver (or more than one): one or more agents
chosen from the gossiper to be informed about the
target. Receivers belong to the same social network,
sharing the same knowledge and values of gossiper and
gossiped. Choosing the receiver is pivotal to achieve
gossiper’s goals: the receiver can be the actual target of
communication or she can serve as a vehicle to reach
the intended target.
When deciding what to tell to whom, the gossiper is
aware of the fact that his action may induce new beliefs or
goals, partially modifying the mind of the receiver (pro-
vided he trusts the gossip and he is interested in it). This
mechanism is really powerful: an agent can induce another
one to perform an action by making her know that, for
instance, the topic has been unfaithful to her. In the above
example, if I have the goal of making John split up with his
wife, telling her that he kissed another woman is a way to
induce a new belief in her mind (‘‘John is a betrayer’’),
which could lead to the formation of a new goal (‘‘I do not
want to be married with a betrayer’’).2 In order to influence
another cognitive agent, i.e., an agent endowed with cog-
nitive representations of goals and the capacity to achieve
them (Conte and Castelfranchi 1995), the influencer needs
to hold a representation of the mind of the influenced. In
other terms, deciding what to tell to whom entails episte-
mic (beliefs and meta-beliefs) and motivational states
(goals), but it also requires the capacity to represent how
the initial states would be modified as a consequence of the
information received.
Deciding what to tell to whom implies also to decide
how to tell, i.e., how the content will be transmitted. In the
framework proposed by Conte and Paolucci, transmission
is an important aspect and the difference between image
and reputation plays a crucial role because it makes pos-
sible to distinguish two ways of reporting on the same
information, depending on the intentions of the source. The
difference between reputation and image in promoting
social control at the aggregate level has been tested in a
variety of contexts using agent-based simulations (Sabater
et al. 2006; Conte et al. 2008; Giardini et al. 2008; Di Tosto
et al. 2010). In these studies, population of interacting
agents can evaluate their peers and transmit either image
or reputation in computer-generated environments, with
different degrees of complexity. Results show that for
different percentages of cheaters in the population, the
spreading of reputation led to better results in terms of
agents’ payoffs because it prevented the diffusion of
retaliatory actions. On the contrary, when agents exchan-
ged image, false informers were retaliated with false
information and after few simulation periods communica-
tion and cooperation collapsed.
Focusing on the way in which an evaluation is trans-
mitted is important because it shifts the focus from the
receiver to the sender. The gossiper does not only select
what to tell to whom, but he also selects the way in which
this information may be passed on, deciding whether to
hide or not the source.
Deterrence and transmission as the evolutionary pillars
of gossip
Humans can acquire knowledge about their peers and their
environment using three different ways: through direct
experience, through observation, and through cultural
information (Frith and Frith 2006). If we narrow the defi-
nition of cultural information, focusing on a special kind of
content, i.e., social evaluations, we see how essential they
are in order to get valuable knowledge about potential
partners and to make predictions about their behaviors. An
evaluation is social when an agent is considered as a means
to achieve the evaluator’s goals in terms of some standards
or norms (Miceli and Castelfranchi 2000). If I say that
‘‘John is a good teacher’’ this means to assess John’s
competences with regard to my goal of receiving/providing
high standard education. If I tell Sally that John is a good
teacher, I assume that she is sharing my goal of receiving
high standard education, as a pupil, or of providing it, and I
also assume that this information may be valuable to her. As
stated by Emler (2001): ‘‘If we are to predict the behavior of




our social environment, we need to know things about its
particular inhabitants and not just about people in general
or in the abstract. Specifically, we need to know what they
are like—their personalities, character, abilities—and what
their relations are with one another’’ (p. 332).
Pivotal to the ability of predicting others’ behaviors is
the capacity of evaluating their actions, attributing them
either a positive or a negative valence. The ability of dis-
criminating between cooperators and cheaters and the
capacity of detecting malevolent informers and false
communication are crucial cognitive mechanisms for gos-
sip and they seem to appear early in ontogeny. Hamlin
et al. (2007) showed that preverbal infants (6-, 9-, 10-, and
12 months old) display social preferences that are influ-
enced by others’ behaviors toward unrelated third parties,
both in a choice paradigm and in a violation of expectation
paradigm: when looking at social interactions, infants
preferred helpers and were independently inclined to avoid
hinderers. The authors suggest that this early capacity for
evaluations can be a biological adaptation evolved to allow
humans to distinguish between cooperators and cheaters
and then to engage in cooperative behaviors with reliable
partners. Analogously, Mascaro and Sperber (2009)
investigated vigilance toward deception in 3- to-5-year-old
children. Their results show that children’s ability to detect
epistemic and intentional components of lying and to dis-
criminate between a benevolent and a malevolent informer
emerges early and implies developmentally distinct com-
ponents of epistemic vigilance.
Being able to distinguish between honest and dishonest
informers becomes critical in large groups in which direct
experience is not feasible, information is asymmetrically
distributed and time to acquire it is a limited resource. In
everyday life, it is not always possible to create one’s own
evaluations and reported evaluations become crucial to
decide whether to interact with someone or how to choose
among potential partners. This engenders problems of
honesty (information manipulation) and accuracy (errone-
ous rumors) that are inherent in human communication and
not specifically raised by gossiping (Nettle 2006).
According to Emler (2001), gossip provides solutions to
the problem of reliability posed by itself ‘‘insofar as any
individual human observer is not dependent on a single
source for social information’’ (p. 133). Collecting infor-
mation from multiple sources should allow people to
overcome the problem of reliability, allowing them to
compare news, refine evaluations, and isolate dishonest
informers. However, this does not rule the possibility of
multiple sources spreading the same false news, either
purposefully or not. There are also situations in which the
abundance of information makes a decision even more
difficult, and it is actually impossible to discriminate
between competing sources, especially when they seem to
possess the same degree of reliability.
Our hypothesis is that the problem of reliability of
gossip can be solved, thanks to two distinct mechanisms.
Deterrence is a general principle, according to which
people fear to be regarded as unreliable because this
inevitably leads to the disruption of social bonds. Although
deterrence can work in general to prevent people from
misbehaving, it is worth noticing that spreading false
information about someone exposes the dishonest informer
to a double risk of being punished, in case the information
is found to be false: both the receiver and the gossiped can
punish him. But deterrence alone would have led to a sit-
uation in which exchanging information about others was
extremely risky and even dangerous for one’s standing in
the group. A solution to this is provided by the second
mechanism, transmission, through which individuals can
pass image as if it was reputation, thus hiding behind an
unknown source. In what follows we will try to articulate
this hypothesis.
A general principle: deterrence
Regarding deterrence, this mechanism is not uniquely
human and works through the threat of social exclusion
(Scott-Phillips 2008). Sufficient conditions for this kind of
signaling are that signals be verified with relative ease and
that costs be incurred when unreliable signals are discov-
ered. In the field of animal communication, an alternative
to deterrence principle is costly signaling or the so-called
handicap principle (Gintis et al. 2001; Maynard Smith and
Harper 2003; Smith 2010; Zahavi and Zahavi 1997),
according to which a given signal reliability depends on its
costs. In conditions in which producing a fake signal would
be extremely costly, individuals able to display it should be
regarded as reliable signalers. Costly signaling has been
successfully applied to explain the provision of collective
goods (Bliege Bird et al. 2001), but its applicability to
language is a matter of debate (Zahavi and Zahavi 1997).
It is worth noting that the fact that gossip arises within
groups and it is about group members increases the like-
lihood of discovering false signals and it also amplifies the
consequences for the cheater. In fact, third parties can
punish the gossiper for false information, either directly
(withholding cooperation, for instance), or indirectly
(reporting other about the malevolent behavior of the
gossiper, thus negatively affecting his reputation). Ayim
(1994) claims that gossip is empowering to its participants
because it gives them access to knowledge, but for the
same reason, it is also quite dangerous: ‘‘the more vital the
information exchanged through gossip, the more poten-
tially damaging such gossip is both to those who are the
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topic of the conversation and to those who do the con-
versing’’ (Ayim 1994, p. 99).
Moreover, the fact that gossip implicitly conveys mes-
sages about the gossiper increases the threat of being
regarded as an unreliable informer. Gossiping implies
messages about the signaler, in terms of his social skills (‘‘I
want you to know that I possess social skills and that I am
able to use them’’), and ability to foresee the addressee’s
needs (‘‘I want you to know that I share some of your
interests, so I hope that you will find meaningful the
information I am giving to you’’). The combination of
these aspects result in a signal about the competence of the
gossiper, his being knowledgeable about what is going on
in the network but also about those who may need or want
a specific information.
Another reason for the efficacy of deterrence is the fact
that reporting false information about someone else means
that the risk of being caught and the consequent punish-
ment are twice bigger: not only X can discover that the
information about Z is false, but Z itself can find out that Y
is spreading negative gossip about him. In this scenario, Y
becomes an unreliable informer for X and a malicious
gossiper for Z, thus loosing at the same time at least two
direct links and a number of other connections, who are
informed about his untrustworthiness.
Loosing links because of false gossip is the opposite of
using it as a means of establishing a relationship, the so
called affiliative aspect, which is one of its main functions
(Gluckman 1963; Dunbar 1996; Emler 2001). Being regar-
ded as a cheater in informational exchanges leads to the
disruption of bonds and to social exclusion, i.e., to the
opposite of what gossip evolved for, according to the ‘‘social
brain hypothesis.’’ Complex social environments in which
our ancestors lived have driven the evolution of large brains,
necessary to store and manipulate information about many
different individuals living in large groups. This implies to
remember not only one’s own relationships with those
individuals, but also the different kinds of bonds they have
with each other (Dunbar and Schultz 2007). In this frame-
work, the social skills required to create and maintain stable
links with our peers are among the driving forces that
selected for large brains within the primate order (Humphrey
1976; Byrne and Whiten 1988; Dunbar 1998). In human
societies, a selective pressure toward larger groups led to the
evolution of language as an adaptation that served the same
function served by grooming in bonding genetically unre-
lated individuals (Dunbar 2001).
Ingram et al. (2009) propose an alternative explanation
in which the selective pressure for larger group sizes is
paired with indirect reciprocity. Basically, expecting to be
punished for false information and knowing that, through
language, there are good chances of undergo absent third-
party punishment led to the evolution of more complex
cognitive abilities. Their argument goes something like
this: language allows individuals to be informed about their
peers’ actions, increasing the observability of interactions.
In systems of indirect reciprocity, reputation is a powerful
signal of the quality of the potential partner, and commu-
nication about others’ reputation greatly enlarges the pos-
sibilities for cooperation. This has created a selective
pressure on humans to evolve specific cognitive mecha-
nisms to represent and manipulate their own reputation in
the eyes of other group members. The propositional theory
of mind (ToM), i.e., the ability of reasoning about beliefs
and desires (Wellman 1990), created the potential for
humans to reason about their own reputation, allowing us
to decide whether to behave selfishly or unselfishly on the
bases of our expectations about other’s behaviors. As
Ingram et al. (2009) put it: ‘‘Language was not just a
cognitive prerequisite for propositional ToM to appear
(…). Language was an adaptive problem for the individual
because it frequently led to absent third-party punishment.
This adaptive problem was solved by new adaptations, in
the form of highly developed ToM and perspective-taking
skills’’ (p. 224). Following this argument, it seems that
using language to transmit information about an absent
third party entails more costs than benefits, making people
vulnerable to being punished by the receiver, the gossiped
and also by third parties, related or not. If this analysis is
correct, how could gossip survive? Why individuals spread
social information, exposing themselves to the risks of
retaliation? How to be sure that the transmission of infor-
mation will not lead to punishment and disrupture of social
bonds? How to account for unverified or uncertain
information spreading? In the next session, we will try to
answer these questions by introducing the mechanism of
transmission.
A specific mechanism: transmission
The threat of social exclusion alone could have led to a
situation in which the costs of transmitting social evalua-
tions were higher than its benefits, thus discouraging
cooperation at the informational level. This is especially
true when considering that, along with intentional misin-
formation, social information spreading can also be inac-
curate, thus coming from errors and misunderstandings.
Were informers to be excluded from the group for every
false or inaccurate evaluation transmitted, gossip would
have become a very risky and potentially dangerous
behavior. In this scenario, the only safe alternative is to
trust only one’s own direct observation and to restrain from
transmitting information, but this implies that cheaters are
recognized only after direct and thus costly experience.
Data coming from simulations experiments (Giardini et al.
2008) show that in control conditions in which agents
Cogn Process
123
could only use direct experience when selecting their
partners, the average payoffs were significantly lower than
in the condition in which communication was allowed. In
laboratory experiments within the framework of experi-
mental economics, the possibility of recording other play-
ers’ reputation actually prevents the public resource from
being overused (Wedekind and Milinski 2000). In general,
the opportunity to build up reputation has been proved to
increase cooperation in experimental games (Wedekind
and Milinski 2000; Milinski et al. 2002) and in more nat-
ural settings (Piazza and Bering 2008). Economic experi-
ments from traditional societies all over the world have
provided strong support to the idea that reputational con-
cerns can promote cooperation and altruistic behaviors
(Gintis et al. 2001; Henrich et al. 2005). So far, evaluating
others seems to be risky but really useful, so how to reduce
the risks of being punished without reducing the benefits of
receiving and transmitting useful information about others?
A possible solution is suggested by Conte and Paolucci
(2002), according to whom reputation transmission has the
following properties:
1. The gossiper is not committed on evaluation’s truth-
value;
2. The gossiper bears no responsibility about evaluations’
credibility and consequences since he pins the blame
on some unspecified source.
Transmitting inaccurate reputation leads to less severe
consequences than spreading inaccurate image, as the agent
who spreads it is not responsible for it. Reputation is
anonymous in itself, it circulates in the social network but
its origin is unknown. Therefore, whereas the spreading of
false image can be easily punished, reputation, even if it is
proven to be false, cannot be paid back, because there is not
anyone in charge for it. This is mainly due to the fact that it
is practically impossible to trace a belief about others’
beliefs back to its origins and to those who hold it.
The possibility of hiding the source of the evaluation,
transforming an image into a reputation and then avoiding
the costs of retaliation, is one of the driving forces behind
the evolution of gossip (Giardini and Conte 2011). Lan-
guage allows humans to manipulate the information in
different ways, ranging from reporting false information to
modifying the source or other elements. This becomes
especially striking when information is about other indi-
viduals, their actions and attitudes, and false reports can
deeply affect their status in the group, their relationships
and several aspects of their lives. Moreover, hiding behind
the source allows individuals to safely use gossip in a
strategic way: individuals competing for scarce resources
may spread false or inaccurate reputation to damage their
competitor’s reputation and improve their own (Barkow
1992; Hess and Hagen 2006).
When informing absent third parties about other indi-
viduals’ actions, humans can lie in two ways: they can
report a false information as if it was true (‘‘I saw John
kissing another woman who was not his wife’’) or they can
report a false information as if they were told by someone
else (‘‘Someone told me that John was kissing another
woman’’). Both information are false and both can be
detected and cause the gossiper to get punished. None-
theless, in the latter case, the gossiper has not direct
responsibility about the information which is reported as
coming from an unknown source. This applies not only on
the gossiper side, but also on the receiver one. In fact,
knowing that the evaluation comes from an unknown
source makes it less trustworthy and pushes toward the
search for further evidence. Hess and Hagen (2006) report
results from four experiments about evaluation of veracity
of reputation-relevant gossip, showing that multiple sour-
ces of gossip increase its perceived veracity. Analogously,
Sommerfeld et al. (2007a, b) tested the effects of multiple
gossip statements on cooperation levels and found that,
even when direct observation was possible, participants
were strongly inclined to rely on multiple consistent
information received by their peers. The absence of the
source could work not only to protect the gossiper, but it
may also function as a cue for the receiver of the fact that
reputational information is not totally reliable and it could
be useful to look for further information.
Conclusions
In social groups, individuals exchange information about
their peers’ actions, behaviors, and attitudes. This exchange
of information permits individuals to make more accurate
and complete predictions and evaluations about their peers;
on the other hand, knowing facts about potential partners is
pivotal to the establishment of new social links. Several
scholars have pointed out the many positive functions
served by gossip, both at the individual and at the group
level. However, the transmission of socially relevant
information about members of one’s own group has also
some drawbacks. In this work, we focused on the problem
of reliability of gossip, trying to suggest that two distinct
mechanisms could have worked in favor of the evolution
and maintenance of this behavior.
To this purpose, we first introduced a cognitive model of
gossip developed by Conte and Paolucci (2002), in which
they call attention to a usually neglected aspect, i.e.,
transmission. When reporting the information about others,
people can lie, either modifying the content of the infor-
mation or its source. The same piece of information is
called ‘‘image’’ when the source is make explicit and
‘‘reputation’’ when the gossiper refers to the gossip as
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coming from an unknown source. This difference is not
inconsequential, since transmitting an evaluation as if
coming from an unknown source means to avoid respon-
sibility for the truth-value of that information, allowing the
sender to escape punishment.
Being punished for reporting false social information
may be not only frequent, but also extremely dangerous
because bonds with the receiver and the gossiped can be
broken, as well as with people coming to know that the
informer is unreliable. This is what we called ‘‘deterrence’’,
a general mechanism that makes informational cheating
unprofitable because the costs of being caught are higher
than the benefits of cheating, in general. Transmission is
the second mechanism, the one that permits to overcome
this limitation by manipulating the source of the informa-
tion. When transmitting an information, people can choose
how to do it, and hiding behind a reputational evaluation
they can escape the related responsibility.
Using agent-based simulation, the difference between
image and reputation has been experimentally tested, and
the results show that image triggers a perverse retaliatory
mechanism that leads cooperation to collapse. Regarding
experiments with human subjects, so far the importance of
transmission has been greatly underrated. Sommerfeld
et al. (2007a, b) report results in which subjects playing
interaction games with real money are given the opportu-
nity of receiving gossip statements. However, these com-
ments are distributed by the experimenter in a centralized
way to subjects, without allowing them to choose what to
tell to whom, as in true gossiping. The same limitation can
be found in observational studies in which it is hard to
determine whether the source is the actual source or he is
simply spreading reputation. Further experimental evi-
dence is needed to verify to what extent reputation can
prevent retaliation and foster the spreading of socially
relevant information.
In this work, the role of language has been purposefully
not taken into consideration because exploring the rela-
tionship between language and gossip would require a whole
paper and can be hardly restricted into few pages. However,
in line with Smith (2010), we surmise that language
encourages new forms of collectively beneficial displays,
i.e., social evaluations transmission and reputation man-
agement. Language provides humans with the opportunity of
exchanging knowledge about their peers and it also allows
them to manipulate this kind of information. This is in line
with the Dunbar’s argument, according to whom: ‘‘Primates
can only know about what they see for themselves. Should an
ally defect or renege on its coalition partner while the partner
is not there, that partner will never know and may thus be
exploited with impunity. Language provides us with a
medium of information exchange that overcomes this limi-
tation. We can monitor what is going elsewhere within the
network, allowing continuous updating of our knowledge of
the matrix of relationships’’ (Dunbar 2001, p. 191). Not only
we can know what happened elsewhere in the group, but we
can decide to tell it to other people, even to inform the whole
group about other’s actions and choices.
Finding a convenient explanation for the evolutionary
stability of gossip is challenging for many reasons. First, it
implies to deal with extremely complex issues, like the
evolution of language and the phylo-genetic and onto-
genetic development of modern humans. Second, evolu-
tionary accounts are often at risk of being ‘‘just so stories,’’
and only accurate testing of the hypotheses can rule out this
possibility. Finally, the complexity of gossip itself, with its
tangled web of affective, informational and strategic
components make it extremely difficult to identify a single
trajectory of evolution and a further investigation of
alternative evolutionary paths is needed.
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